- Add real implementations for /status, /cost, and /version slash commands
- /status shows session metadata including message count and token usage
- /cost displays cumulative token usage including cache metrics
- /version shows the claw-code version
- All three commands are fully backed by existing Session infrastructure
- Add comprehensive tests for all three commands
- Remove expectations that these commands return None
These commands fulfill the requirement to implement 2-3 missing GJC slash
commands that the existing claw-code runtime can fully support.
- Add selector field to ReadFileInput accepting GJC syntax (:50, :50-200, :50+150, :raw)
- Implement read_file_with_selector and read_file_in_workspace_with_selector
- Add apply_line_selector to parse and apply selectors to file contents
- Add truncation_footer field to ReadFileOutput for GJC-compatible output
- Add comprehensive tests for selector parsing and application through tool entry point
Selectors take precedence over offset/limit for backward compatibility.
Closes#3323
- Support line range selectors: :50, :50-200, :50+150, :5-16,960-973
- Support special modes: :raw, :conflicts
- Parse comma-separated ranges with automatic merging of overlapping/adjacent ranges
- Comprehensive unit tests covering all selector formats
- Fixes#3323 Slice 2.1 - Phase 1a (read tool selector parsing)
Five defects found by auditing the agent stack, all of which let the harness act
confidently on a wrong picture of its own state.
1. A turn that errored discarded the record of tools that had already run. The CLI
hands run_turn a CLONE of the session; the turn appends the user message, each
assistant reply, and a tool_result per executed tool to that clone alone. The error
path dropped it while the side effects of those tools remained on disk, and the
recovery path then replayed the same user input against a session showing no sign
they had ever run — inviting a second execution of tools that are not idempotent.
The clone is now adopted before teardown, and recovery resumes the turn instead of
replaying it (new ConversationRuntime::resume_turn).
2. Every sizing guard was computed against the model NAME's context window. With a
local server behind a cloud model alias that is 200k against a much smaller
backend, which does not make the preflights inaccurate — it makes them unreachable.
CLAW_CONTEXT_WINDOW now declares the real window; model_token_limit honours it and
returns a limit for unrecognised models instead of None, max_tokens is capped to a
quarter of it, and the auto-compaction threshold derives from it (70%) rather than
defaulting to a 200k-window constant.
3. Whether to recover by discarding conversation history was decided by substring
matching on rendered error prose, including strings that ordinary transport and
decode failures also produce — so a dropped connection cost the session its
transcript. Classification now happens in the API layer, where the error still has
its type and the request is still in hand: typed overflow errors, plus ambiguous
transport failures only when the request actually filled the window. The two
copy-pasted detection blocks are gone.
4. The top-level agent loop had no iteration ceiling (usize::MAX) while spawned
subagents were bounded at 32. It now gets the same bound, overridable with
CLAW_MAX_TURN_ITERATIONS.
5. Auto-continue nudges were injected as USER turns, so harness-authored text was
persisted, re-sent on every later request, and folded into compaction summaries as
something the user had said. They are recorded as system turns now; the wire
payload is unchanged.
Also replaces the repository's own self-host section, which described a translator
and a serving stack no longer in the request path. That file is folded into the
system prompt verbatim, so it was briefing the model with an architecture that does
not exist.
(cherry picked from commit c8834cb4d1a3372eb70241429f641162a420297e)
A reply carrying no tool_use ended the turn unconditionally. Small local
models routinely narrate the next tool call in prose — "Now running the
EEC-V probe:" — and then emit EOS, so the announced work never happened
and the user was dropped back at the prompt. The same failure wears a
second hat mid-task: stopping to ask for a go-ahead on work already
requested.
The loop now inspects the final line of a tool-less reply. If it
announces a pending action, or asks a question after tools have already
run this turn, a short nudge is pushed as a user message and the loop
continues instead of breaking. The budget is bounded (default 3 per
turn, CLAW_MAX_STALL_NUDGES, 0 disables) so a model that really is
finished still gets to stop.
Prevention pairs with recovery: the "Doing tasks" system-prompt section
now tells the model to act in the turn it plans in.
Tests cover the auto-continue, the bound, a plain completion that must
NOT be nudged, the disable switch, and last-line-only detection. The
behavioural pair was mutation-checked: reverting the continue to a break
fails both.
(cherry picked from commit 9035fe6f4bf4a8d4cb70d7a3baf1f3748c757498)
The git diff snapshot is rendered into the *system prompt*, so its cost is
paid again by every session whose working tree has changed -- and a diff
changes on essentially every edit. The 50_000-char budget was four times the
entire instruction-file budget (12_000) and unbounded in practical effect: a
single modified file added ~15_000 tokens to the prompt.
Measured against a self-hosted backend, one uncommitted change took the
prompt from 8_302 to 23_457 tokens and a one-word reply from ~3 s to 296 s.
With the new default the same session is 7_911 tokens and 36 s. That cost is
absorbable against a hosted frontier model and ruinous against a local one.
Default is now 4_000 chars, matching MAX_INSTRUCTION_FILE_CHARS, and is
overridable with CLAW_MAX_GIT_DIFF_CHARS following the same pattern as
CLAW_MAX_READ_CHARS. A budget of 0 omits the snapshot entirely rather than
emitting an empty section with a truncation marker; git status and the
recent-commit list are unaffected either way.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RNKqVB2JE9UnCkz8FC9HPy
(cherry picked from commit e01c6ea43d56a97e284ab80fa7a90a479997ed74)
Two related gaps let a single agentic turn exceed a small context window,
with no recovery path once it happened.
1. read_file's character ceiling was a hardcoded 64 KB (~16k tokens), sized
for a 200k window. Two reads in one turn reach ~48k tokens, which a 32k
backend rejects outright. Make it configurable via CLAW_MAX_READ_CHARS,
defaulting to the existing 64 KB so behavior is unchanged unless set.
Reads remain paged, not refused: callers still get truncated/nextOffset.
2. Compaction could not help, because it works at message granularity and an
agentic turn is five messages (user / assistant+tool_use / tool_result /
assistant+tool_use / tool_result). With preserve_recent_messages: 4 the
only droppable message is the short user prompt, so the two oversized
tool results were preserved verbatim by design.
Trim preserved tool-result payloads over 16 KB to a head/tail excerpt with
an explicit "[... N characters elided ...]" marker, so the model knows its
view is partial and can re-read. Small payloads pass through untouched.
Also apply trimming on the early-return path: a session can exceed the
window while holding fewer messages than preserve_recent_messages, where
should_compact is false and message-granular compaction has no move to
make. compact_now no longer gates on removed_message_count alone, which
would have computed the smaller session and then discarded it.
Also fixes a pre-existing flaky test: repl_executes_python_code resolves the
python runtime through PATH, which the PowerShell tests blank while they run.
It now takes the same env_lock, so it no longer intermittently fails with
"python runtime not found" on a machine that has python.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013bVvRYn7CQKR6hT2j1L6Cs
(cherry picked from commit b0d4d41e8132f8dc75717b1f74554d649639de10)
The usage-based compaction gate is post-hoc: it can only see the context
after a call returns and reports its counters. Between that measurement and
the next request the session can grow enormously - a reasoning model emitting
a long thinking block, then a tool result carrying a large file.
Observed live: a call measured at 17,858 prompt tokens generated 10,842 more,
a read_file added ~19k on top, and the next request reached the provider at
47,755 tokens and was rejected outright. No tuning of the post-hoc threshold
prevents that, because nothing measures the session in between.
Add a pre-send check driven by estimate_session_tokens, a local heuristic over
the transcript, so it costs no API call and works before any usage has been
recorded at all.
Note the limit of this: compaction preserves the 4 most recent messages, and
in an agentic tool-use loop those messages ARE the tool results carrying the
bulk. This check bounds gradual growth; it cannot rescue a session whose last
four messages already exceed the window.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013bVvRYn7CQKR6hT2j1L6Cs
(cherry picked from commit 26ab52d70fb17e49b74d523aecfc1da7f69a6d60)
`maybe_auto_compact` gated on `usage_tracker.cumulative_usage().input_tokens`,
which is wrong in two independent ways:
1. It ignores cached input. With prompt caching a warm call reports
`input_tokens: 2` and puts the real context in `cache_read_input_tokens`,
so the counter barely moved and auto-compaction never fired at all,
however large the conversation grew. Backends without prompt caching
report the whole prompt as `input_tokens`, so the bug was invisible there.
2. A sum across calls is not a context measurement, and it never decreases.
Once it did cross the threshold, every subsequent iteration compacted
again, permanently, even after compaction had shrunk the context.
Gate on the latest call's total input instead — input + cache_creation +
cache_read — which is the live context window size. It rises with the real
context and falls back below the threshold once compaction has done its job,
so no counter reset is needed.
`CLAUDE_CODE_AUTO_COMPACT_INPUT_TOKENS` now means what it reads like:
compact when the live context reaches N tokens. The default of 100_000 is
unchanged and still lands at 50% of a 200k window.
Adds `TokenUsage::total_input_tokens()` (saturating) and four tests: the
cached-usage shape that never fired, non-latching across three turns, and
two unit tests for the new helper.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013bVvRYn7CQKR6hT2j1L6Cs
(cherry picked from commit aebba4e77eddf585fc5b21123967dbc4ebb6e6a1)
The suite asserted against whatever the developer's box happened to be
configured as. Two independent leaks, both surfaced by a real `~/.claw`:
1. `parse_args` resolves defaults — notably `permissions.defaultMode` —
through the user-scope config, which `default_config_home()` reads from
`CLAW_CONFIG_HOME` falling back to `$HOME/.claw`. Nothing overrode it, so
a `defaultMode` of `dontAsk` on the host turned 12 assertions from
`WorkspaceWrite` into `DangerFullAccess`. `env_lock()` now returns an
`EnvGuard` that points `CLAW_CONFIG_HOME` at a fresh empty directory and
restores the previous value on drop, so "no user config" is the state
under test. All 42 call sites already bind the guard, so this fixes them
at once; tests that want a populated config home can still set the var
themselves afterwards. `removed_login_and_logout_subcommands_error_helpfully`
asserted a Default-sourced permission mode without taking the guard at
all, and now does.
2. `direct_resume_safe_slash_commands_route_to_local_json_actions_831`
hardcoded `/sandbox` => "warn", which is only true where namespace
isolation is unsupported and just the filesystem sandbox is active
(#731). On a host with working user namespaces the correct answer is
"ok". That entry now accepts either; the test is about #831 routing —
local JSON action instead of `interactive_only` — not about the kernel
under the runner.
Verified with the real ~/.claw/settings.json in place (defaultMode=dontAsk):
cargo test --workspace 0 failures, clippy --workspace --all-targets
-D warnings 0 findings, scripts/fmt.sh clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q9McEEH32ZtyM62GSXVSyJ
(cherry picked from commit 67aa4530c22f6fdf95a29d6a46992af137134c67)
`cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` is this repo's own
documented verification command, and it could not run to completion. Earlier
compile failures were masking a further 48 lints; with those cleared the
workspace now passes with zero findings.
Real fixes, not suppressions:
- status_json_value took 8 positional parameters, four of them a tail of
`Option<&_>` that most callers passed as None — trivially transposable.
Grouped into `StatusJsonExtras` with a Default impl; all 7 call sites now
name only the fields they actually set.
- extract_help_metadata's 8-tuple return is now a documented `HelpMetadata`
alias.
- the auto-compact loop indexed preserve_schedule by its loop counter;
it now iterates the array directly.
- a sandbox status chain had two identical arms; merged the condition.
- a filter_map whose every arm returned Some is now a map.
- 33 unused stdout/stderr bindings in the output-format contract tests are
prefixed with `_`, and 9 `map_or(false, ..)` are now `is_some_and(..)`.
NOTE: several `--bin claw` tests (parse_args defaults) read the *real*
`~/.claw/settings.json` rather than an isolated config home, so they fail on
any machine whose user config sets `permissions.defaultMode`. With that file
moved aside the binary's suite is 207/207. That isolation gap is pre-existing
and left for a separate change.
Verified: clippy workspace/all-targets/-D warnings reports 0; cargo test
--workspace passes with the user config neutralised; scripts/fmt.sh clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q9McEEH32ZtyM62GSXVSyJ
(cherry picked from commit 03c8a8fd7ba6e405a8217d00d3766c1c6367e527)
`ApiError` is the `Err` half of nearly every `Result` in the api crate, and
its `Api` variant carried ~139 bytes inline (8 fields, four of them
`Option<String>`). That tripped clippy::result_large_err on 35 signatures
and, with -D warnings, made the whole crate unbuildable under the repo's
own documented verification command.
Move the payload into `ApiErrorDetails` behind a `Box`:
- `ApiError::Api(Box<ApiErrorDetails>)`, with `ApiError::api(..)` to
construct and `api_details()` to borrow
- `ApiErrorDetails` re-exported from the crate root
- adding a field here can no longer re-inflate every signature
This also simplifies `enrich_bearer_auth_error`, which previously
destructured and rebuilt all eight fields at five separate return points
just to append a hint; it now mutates the boxed payload in place.
Also clears the remaining pre-existing lints that blocked -D warnings:
unused test bindings, a redundant `use serde_json`, and an explicit
`.into_iter()` in claw-rag-service.
Verified: cargo test --workspace passes, 0 failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q9McEEH32ZtyM62GSXVSyJ
(cherry picked from commit e9210bd75eb76e5d88b2ae797f537102bcabd41d)
An unbounded read_file returned the entire file, which on a small-context
backend overflows the model's window. The backend then rejects the whole
request (llama-server: "request (N tokens) exceeds the available context
size"), which kills the turn — so reading everything at once is precisely
what makes the session stop. Observed live: one 100 KB source file is
~25k tokens against a 32k window with a ~6k-token prefix, and a session
read the same file three times and died on six 400s.
read_file now returns a page and says so:
- absent `limit` yields DEFAULT_READ_LINES (2000) rather than EOF
- MAX_READ_CHARS (64 KB) bounds the payload even when `limit` is
explicit, so minified or generated files can't defeat the line cap
- `truncated` and `nextOffset` tell the caller it has a partial view
and exactly where to resume; the tool description explains both
MAX_READ_SIZE (10 MB) is untouched: it is a process guard against slurping
huge or binary blobs, not a context guard, and at ~2.5M tokens it never
fires on the files that actually overflow a window.
Also clears pre-existing clippy failures in trident.rs that blocked
-D warnings on every edit to this crate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q9McEEH32ZtyM62GSXVSyJ
(cherry picked from commit c796d7e5eedc66b0cb37bb6823ec772f8ceef9cf)
refactor(cli): let the emitter report the output tail it leaves behind
Two places believed they owned terminal output: consume_stream streams
assistant deltas live while emit_output = true, and run_turn decided
whether to emit a separating newline before spinner.finish by guessing
from final_assistant_text(&summary).
That guess agrees with reality only because every *other* writer happens to
terminate its output with a newline — tool results go through
stream_markdown (which appends one), thinking summaries are written with a
trailing newline, and tool-call headers use writeln! — so the assistant
text path is the only one that can leave a partial line. That is a property
of the current renderers rather than of the streaming protocol, and it is
not enforced anywhere.
TerminalTail is state the emitter records into as it writes: both live
writers (AnthropicRuntimeClient::consume_stream and the tool-result blocks
in CliToolExecutor::execute) now push bytes through a TailTrackingWriter
that reports the last byte written, and the caller that ends a turn asks
where the emitter stopped instead of inferring it.
The heuristic also left the failure arm unguarded. A turn that streamed text
and then errored called spinner.fail on a partial line, which the line
clear then erased; that arm now carries the same guard.
Also gate the animated spinner.tick frame on is_terminal(). That frame is
pure cursor control (save, rewrite line, restore) and emits no newline, so
down a pipe it leaves an unterminated banner that the first streamed delta
then continues on the same physical line.
—
*[repo owner's gaebal-gajae (clawdbot) 🦞]*
Reviewed and verified: 4 new tests added, all passing. 116 lines added to test JSON escape sequences and i64 boundaries. No production code changes.
—
*[repo owner's gaebal-gajae (clawdbot) 🦞]*
Route groq-prefixed models through the OpenAI-compatible client,
apply Groq token-limit metadata, and skip local tool injection for
compound models.
Add regression coverage for routing, token limits, and compound
local-tool behavior.
Co-authored-by: Oz <oz-agent@warp.dev>
feat: add persistent auto-memory system
Implement a file-based persistent memory system that allows the AI to retain knowledge about users, feedback, projects, and references across sessions.
## Implementation Details
- MemoryStore data layer with FNV-1a workspace fingerprinting
- MemoryRead/MemoryWrite tools with security hardening (path traversal, symlink, absolute path, and size limit protections)
- System prompt injection of MEMORY.md index with prompt injection mitigation (fenced code block + trust-lowering notice)
- autoMemoryEnabled config option (defaults to true)
- Doctor health check for auto-memory state
- /memory command enhancement showing persistent memory info
## Verification
✓ 1023 lib tests pass
✓ Output format contract tests pass
✓ Release build succeeds
✓ Security hardening verified
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(runtime): prompt permission mode never invokes the prompter
PermissionMode derives Ord from declaration order, placing Prompt (and Allow)
above the real privilege ladder (ReadOnly < WorkspaceWrite < DangerFullAccess).
In PermissionPolicy::authorize_with_context the ladder check
'current_mode >= required_mode' therefore evaluates true for every tool when the
active mode is Prompt (3 >= {0,1,2}), returning Allow and making the subsequent
'if current_mode == PermissionMode::Prompt' branch that routes to prompt_or_deny
unreachable.
Effect: a session configured with the 'prompt' permission mode silently
auto-allows every tool and never calls the prompter (reached via
ConversationRuntime::run_turn with an interactive prompter), defeating the mode's
entire purpose. The sibling PermissionEnforcer already special-cases Prompt
before its own 'active_mode >= required_mode' check, confirming Prompt is not
meant to be part of the ordered ladder.
Fix: exclude Prompt from the ordered-ladder comparison so Prompt mode falls
through to the interactive prompt path. Allow remains handled by its explicit
equality check. The same comparison appears twice in authorize_with_context —
once in the shared tail and once inside the 'Some(PermissionOverride::Allow)'
arm, which is reached when a hook emits permissionDecision "allow" — so both
copies carry the guard; guarding only the tail still left a hook able to
auto-allow every tool in Prompt mode without ever consulting the prompter.
Adds regression tests covering Prompt mode with a prompter, without a prompter,
and with a hook allow override.
* refactor(runtime): make the permission privilege ladder an explicit rank
`PermissionMode` derived `PartialOrd`/`Ord`, so the ladder deciding whether a
tool runs without asking was declaration order. A variant inserted in the middle
of the enum re-ranked it silently, and the difference between "this tool may
run" and "this tool may run after a prompt" was a property of where an `enum`
line happened to sit. That is how `Prompt` came to outrank `DangerFullAccess`,
satisfy `current_mode >= required_mode` for every tool, and skip the prompter.
Replace the derive with `privilege_rank`, an exhaustive `match` naming every
variant, so inserting one is a build failure rather than a silent re-ranking.
`Ord` is deliberately not derived, so a stray `>=` on two modes no longer
compiles; the two comparisons outside this module now say which rank they read
(`PermissionEnforcer::check_with_required_mode` and the `claw doctor` permission
check). Both keep their previous answers, since `privilege_rank` reproduces the
old declaration order exactly, including `Prompt` and `Allow` above the tiers.
`Prompt` and `Allow` are modes of operation, not privilege tiers, so they are
never ranked *against* a tool requirement. The new `covers` predicate states
that by name rather than by number: `Allow` always covers, `Prompt` never does
(it asks), and only the three tiers compare ranks.
That also collapses the duplicated ladder in `authorize_with_context`. The
`Some(PermissionOverride::Allow)` arm carried a second, identical copy of the
ask-rule check and the ladder; it now falls through to the single copy below,
so a hook `allow` is an override rather than a bypass and the two copies can no
longer drift apart.
Behaviour is unchanged for every (mode, requirement, rule, override)
combination. The tests pin the `Prompt` routes — plain and hook-`allow` — across
all three tiers, plus the rank ordering itself.
docs: correct rust workspace crate count to 11
This updates the documentation to reflect the actual number of crates in the
rust workspace, which is 11, not 9. The workspace contains:
- api
- claw-analog
- claw-rag-service
- commands
- compat-harness
- mock-anthropic-service
- plugins
- runtime
- rusty-claude-cli
- telemetry
- tools
The `## Model Aliases` table and `MODEL_REGISTRY` had drifted: the table
listed only the three Anthropic aliases while the resolver had grown the
xAI and Kimi entries, so an alias could resolve without being documented.
Assert the two agree in both directions — every registry alias appears in
the table with the canonical id and auth env var it actually resolves to,
and the table introduces no alias the resolver does not know. Each row is
also checked case-insensitively, since the README claims `OPUS` behaves
the same as `opus`.
Also pin that a provider-prefixed form such as `anthropic/opus` is not an
alias: it is passed through as-is rather than expanded. The README now
says so, which is what made the distinction worth a test rather than a
comment.
validate_workspace_boundary compared paths lexically, so a location inside
the workspace spelled with different letter case (a working directory typed
as c:\users\... for C:\Users\...) or through the \\.\ device namespace was
reported as escaping the workspace.
When the lexical comparison fails, compare the path's canonical form before
reporting an escape. A path whose canonical form is outside the workspace
stays rejected.
accepts_equivalent_extended_path_at_workspace_boundary builds its paths
with backslash separators. Backslashes only separate path components on
Windows, so on Linux each path is a single component, the boundary check
rejects the path, and cargo test fails.
Run the test only on Windows, and call validate_workspace_boundary through
super:: so non-Windows test builds do not warn about an unused import.
Root knowledge base plus complexity-scored subdirectory files for the
rust/ workspace, its five highest-mass crates (runtime, rusty-claude-cli,
api, tools, commands, plugins), and the src/ Python porting workspace.
Generated via init-deep: 13 parallel explore agents, LSP/ast-grep code
map, centrality-scored placement. Snapshot in .omo/init-deep.json (local).
Keep extended-length and regular Windows paths comparable when enforcing workspace boundaries, including first-run roots that cannot yet be canonicalized. Add regression coverage for DOS and UNC path forms.
Signed-off-by: Suliman Abdulrazzaq <suliman9000a@gmail.com>
The startup probe validated only the mapping flags against the trivial
program `true`, but the real launcher always adds
--mount --ipc --pid --uts --fork. On environments where the user
namespace is created but mount propagation inside it is restricted
(e.g. AppArmor-restricted CI runners), the fallback mapping passed the
probe and the sandbox activated, yet every sandboxed command died with
"cannot change root filesystem propagation: Permission denied",
silently returning empty tool output and breaking the mock parity
suite.
The candidates now define the complete static launcher shape (mapping
flags + namespace flags), so probe success implies launch success; the
launcher reuses the candidate instead of re-appending the namespace
flags, keeping probe and launch as one source of truth. The
order-guarding test asserts the namespace flags are present in every
candidate.
Co-authored-by: linkst <2024023709@m.scnu.edu.cn>
The fallback candidate relies on the setuid newuidmap/newgidmap helpers
(uidmap package) plus a subuid/subgid range for the current user. Note in
the candidate docs that the startup probe rejects the candidate when those
are missing, so the plain --map-root-user form is used instead.
Plain `unshare --user --map-root-user` fails on kernels and containers
that block unprivileged writes to /proc/self/uid_map (e.g. GitHub Actions,
restricted AppArmor profiles). On those systems util-linux delegates to the
setuid newuidmap/newgidmap helpers when --map-auto is also present.
Add the combined form as a fallback candidate and build the launcher args
from the probed mapping, so systems without newuidmap/newgidmap or a
/etc/subuid range keep using the plain form.
clawdbot
Bellman
dependabot[bot]
DaBear987
reacechalmers
AbdullahFageehandOz
Ming LiuandClaude Opus 4.6
Suliman Abdulrazzaq
YeonGyu-Kim
code-yeongyuandlinkst