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gaebal-gajae 09731036ac Fix untrusted project hooks in read-only mode 2026-10-11 20:12:25 +00:00
16 changed files with 63 additions and 491 deletions

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@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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@@ -1 +0,0 @@
{"pid":1,"start_time":"unknown","token":"1a2e8a33-76f2-4175-ac23-1521458f12a2","owner_host_id":"7af2fb0e8e37bd543e3d0bda6f205b56f30077b5a9b77e83208e94ae441315ac","released":true}
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
{"pid":1,"start_time":"unknown","token":"a1342032-af80-4a49-a783-291bf73bf027","owner_host_id":"7af2fb0e8e37bd543e3d0bda6f205b56f30077b5a9b77e83208e94ae441315ac","released":true}
Whitespace-only changes.
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
{
"version": 1,
"sessionId": "5e2dd1e8-ea4b-4af1-b56b-89ab7cca4299",
"pid": 487360,
"host": "127.0.0.1",
"port": 37541,
"url": "ws://127.0.0.1:37541",
"token": "LlIfu_aHH57jfys2Ii0ORMrnu56NLAa1",
"startedAt": 1791842673967,
"updatedAt": 1791842673967,
"stale": false
}
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
{"effectMarker":"f441857a-f591-474b-b34a-6d89b2bf9feb","incarnation":"linux:159099652","pid":487360}
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
{"effectMarker":"f441857a-f591-474b-b34a-6d89b2bf9feb","incarnation":"linux:159099652","pid":487360}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ rust/
## Stats
- **~20K lines** of Rust
- **11 crates** in workspace
- **9 crates** in workspace
- **Binary name:** `claw`
- **Default model:** `claude-opus-4-7`
- **Default permissions:** `workspace-write`
+14 -130
View File
@@ -40,32 +40,17 @@ fn is_binary_file(path: &Path) -> io::Result<bool> {
/// the workspace boundary (e.g. via `../` traversal or symlink).
#[allow(dead_code)]
fn validate_workspace_boundary(resolved: &Path, workspace_root: &Path) -> io::Result<()> {
let workspace_root = normalize_for_comparison(workspace_root);
let comparable = normalize_for_comparison(resolved);
if comparable.starts_with(&workspace_root) || resolves_within(resolved, &workspace_root) {
return Ok(());
if !resolved.starts_with(workspace_root) {
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied,
format!(
"path {} escapes workspace boundary {}",
resolved.display(),
workspace_root.display()
),
));
}
Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied,
format!(
"path {} escapes workspace boundary {}",
comparable.display(),
workspace_root.display()
),
))
}
/// Whether `resolved` names a location inside `workspace_root` once the
/// filesystem resolves it. Windows accepts several spellings of one location
/// that [`Path::starts_with`] treats as different: letter case (a working
/// directory typed as `c:\users\...` for `C:\Users\...`), the `\\.\` device
/// namespace, and 8.3 short names. Only consulted after the lexical comparison
/// fails, so it can accept such a spelling but never widens what already
/// compared inside, and a path whose canonical form is outside stays rejected.
fn resolves_within(resolved: &Path, workspace_root: &Path) -> bool {
resolved
.canonicalize()
.is_ok_and(|canonical| normalize_for_comparison(&canonical).starts_with(workspace_root))
Ok(())
}
/// Text payload returned by file-reading operations.
@@ -542,29 +527,9 @@ fn build_grep_content_output(
}
fn canonicalize_workspace_root(workspace_root: &Path) -> PathBuf {
let canonical = workspace_root
workspace_root
.canonicalize()
.unwrap_or_else(|_| workspace_root.to_path_buf());
normalize_for_comparison(&canonical)
}
/// Normalize Windows' extended-length path prefix before comparing paths.
///
/// `std::fs::canonicalize` returns paths with a `\\?\` prefix on Windows,
/// while a workspace root may still be represented as a regular path when it
/// cannot be canonicalized (for example, while a workspace is bootstrapping).
/// These paths refer to the same location but do not compare equal with
/// [`Path::starts_with`]. Keep the comparison representation stable without
/// changing the paths returned to callers.
fn normalize_for_comparison(path: &Path) -> PathBuf {
let raw = path.to_string_lossy();
if let Some(unc_path) = raw.strip_prefix(r"\\?\UNC\") {
return PathBuf::from(format!(r"\\{unc_path}"));
}
if let Some(dos_path) = raw.strip_prefix(r"\\?\") {
return PathBuf::from(dos_path);
}
path.to_path_buf()
.unwrap_or_else(|_| workspace_root.to_path_buf())
}
fn should_skip_glob_dir(entry: &DirEntry) -> bool {
@@ -812,9 +777,8 @@ mod tests {
use super::{
component_contains_glob, derive_glob_walk_root, edit_file, expand_braces, glob_search,
grep_search, is_symlink_escape, normalize_for_comparison, read_file,
read_file_in_workspace, write_file, write_file_in_workspace, GrepSearchInput,
MAX_WRITE_SIZE,
grep_search, is_symlink_escape, read_file, read_file_in_workspace, write_file,
write_file_in_workspace, GrepSearchInput, MAX_WRITE_SIZE,
};
fn temp_path(name: &str) -> std::path::PathBuf {
@@ -942,86 +906,6 @@ mod tests {
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&outside);
}
#[test]
fn normalizes_windows_extended_length_prefixes_for_boundary_checks() {
let dos_path = PathBuf::from(r"C:\workspace\file.txt");
let extended_dos_path = PathBuf::from(r"\\?\C:\workspace\file.txt");
assert_eq!(
normalize_for_comparison(&extended_dos_path),
dos_path,
"extended DOS paths should compare like their regular form"
);
let unc_path = PathBuf::from(r"\\server\share\workspace\file.txt");
let extended_unc_path = PathBuf::from(r"\\?\UNC\server\share\workspace\file.txt");
assert_eq!(
normalize_for_comparison(&extended_unc_path),
unc_path,
"extended UNC paths should compare like their regular form"
);
}
// Backslash-separated paths only parse into path components on Windows.
#[test]
#[cfg(windows)]
fn accepts_equivalent_extended_path_at_workspace_boundary() {
let root = PathBuf::from(r"C:\workspace");
let resolved = PathBuf::from(r"\\?\C:\workspace\src\main.rs");
super::validate_workspace_boundary(&resolved, &root)
.expect("equivalent Windows path representations should be accepted");
}
#[test]
#[cfg(unix)]
fn accepts_a_path_that_resolves_inside_the_workspace() {
let workspace = temp_path("boundary-alias-workspace");
let aliases = temp_path("boundary-alias-links");
std::fs::create_dir_all(workspace.join("src")).expect("workspace dir should be created");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&aliases).expect("alias dir should be created");
let alias = aliases.join("src");
std::os::unix::fs::symlink(workspace.join("src"), &alias).expect("symlink should create");
let root = workspace
.canonicalize()
.expect("workspace should canonicalize");
super::validate_workspace_boundary(&alias, &root)
.expect("a spelling that resolves inside the workspace should be accepted");
super::validate_workspace_boundary(&aliases, &root)
.expect_err("a path that resolves outside the workspace must stay rejected");
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&workspace);
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&aliases);
}
// Windows resolves one location from spellings that compare unequal as
// paths, letter case and the `\\.\` device namespace among them.
#[test]
#[cfg(windows)]
fn accepts_other_windows_spellings_of_a_workspace_path() {
let workspace = temp_path("Boundary-Case-Workspace");
std::fs::create_dir_all(workspace.join("src")).expect("workspace dir should be created");
let root = workspace
.canonicalize()
.expect("workspace should canonicalize");
let lower = PathBuf::from(workspace.join("src").to_string_lossy().to_lowercase());
super::validate_workspace_boundary(&lower, &root)
.expect("a lower-cased spelling of a workspace path should be accepted");
let device = PathBuf::from(format!(r"\\.\{}", workspace.join("src").display()));
super::validate_workspace_boundary(&device, &root)
.expect("a device-namespace spelling of a workspace path should be accepted");
let parent = workspace
.parent()
.expect("workspace has a parent")
.to_path_buf();
super::validate_workspace_boundary(&parent, &root)
.expect_err("the workspace's parent must stay rejected");
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&workspace);
}
#[test]
#[cfg(unix)]
fn workspace_write_rejects_parent_symlink_escape_regression_3007_class() {
@@ -81,10 +81,8 @@ impl PermissionEnforcer {
let active_mode = self.policy.active_mode();
// Check if active mode meets the dynamically determined required mode.
// Ranked explicitly: `PermissionMode` no longer derives `Ord`, so the
// ladder is a named function rather than declaration order.
if active_mode.privilege_rank() >= required_mode.privilege_rank() {
// Check if active mode meets the dynamically determined required mode
if active_mode >= required_mode {
return EnforcementResult::Allowed;
}
+28 -187
View File
@@ -5,10 +5,7 @@ use serde_json::Value;
use crate::config::RuntimePermissionRuleConfig;
/// Permission level assigned to a tool invocation or runtime session.
///
/// Deliberately **not** `PartialOrd`/`Ord`: see [`PermissionMode::privilege_rank`]
/// for why ordering is a named function here rather than declaration order.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord)]
pub enum PermissionMode {
ReadOnly,
WorkspaceWrite,
@@ -28,53 +25,6 @@ impl PermissionMode {
Self::Allow => "allow",
}
}
/// Position on the privilege ladder used by [`PermissionPolicy`].
///
/// This is the only ranking, and `Ord` is intentionally not derived, so a
/// stray `active_mode >= required_mode` no longer compiles. Ranking through
/// declaration order meant a variant inserted in the middle of the enum
/// silently re-ranked the ladder, and the difference between "this tool may
/// run" and "this tool may run after a prompt" was therefore a property of
/// where an `enum` line happened to sit. Every variant is named here, so an
/// insertion is a build failure instead of a silent re-ranking; the two
/// comparisons outside this module that do read a rank — the
/// `PermissionEnforcer`'s `check_with_required_mode` and the `claw doctor`
/// permission check — now say so at the call site.
///
/// `Prompt` and `Allow` are *modes of operation*, not privilege tiers. They
/// rank above every tier so those two callers keep the answers they had, but
/// they are never ranked *against* a tier: see [`Self::covers`].
#[must_use]
pub const fn privilege_rank(self) -> u8 {
match self {
Self::ReadOnly => 0,
Self::WorkspaceWrite => 1,
Self::DangerFullAccess => 2,
Self::Prompt => 3,
Self::Allow => 4,
}
}
/// Whether a session running in `self` may use a tool that requires
/// `required` without asking.
///
/// Only tiers answer this by rank. `Allow` never asks and `Prompt` always
/// asks — it is the exact opposite of a silent allow — so neither is a
/// statement about how much of the workspace the session may touch, and
/// comparing either to `required` is comparing a mode to a tier. That
/// comparison is what let `Prompt`, which outranks `DangerFullAccess`, make
/// the ladder return `Allow` for every tool and skip the prompter entirely.
#[must_use]
pub const fn covers(self, required: Self) -> bool {
match self {
Self::Allow => true,
Self::Prompt => false,
Self::ReadOnly | Self::WorkspaceWrite | Self::DangerFullAccess => {
self.privilege_rank() >= required.privilege_rank()
}
}
}
}
/// Hook-provided override applied before standard permission evaluation.
@@ -286,12 +236,29 @@ impl PermissionPolicy {
prompter,
);
}
// A hook `allow` is an override, not a bypass: the ask-rule check
// and the privilege ladder below still run for it. Both used to be
// spelled out a second time inside this arm, which is why the ladder
// existed in two copies that had to be corrected in step — and the
// second copy is exactly what a fix for one of them is easy to miss.
Some(PermissionOverride::Allow) | None => {}
Some(PermissionOverride::Allow) => {
if let Some(rule) = ask_rule {
let reason = format!(
"tool '{tool_name}' requires approval due to ask rule '{}'",
rule.raw
);
return Self::prompt_or_deny(
tool_name,
input,
current_mode,
required_mode,
Some(reason),
prompter,
);
}
if allow_rule.is_some()
|| current_mode == PermissionMode::Allow
|| current_mode >= required_mode
{
return PermissionOutcome::Allow;
}
}
None => {}
}
if let Some(rule) = ask_rule {
@@ -309,10 +276,10 @@ impl PermissionPolicy {
);
}
// The ladder, in one place. An `allow` rule is an explicit grant for
// this tool and outranks the mode; otherwise the mode decides through
// [`PermissionMode::covers`].
if allow_rule.is_some() || current_mode.covers(required_mode) {
if allow_rule.is_some()
|| current_mode == PermissionMode::Allow
|| current_mode >= required_mode
{
return PermissionOutcome::Allow;
}
@@ -620,132 +587,6 @@ mod tests {
));
}
#[test]
fn prompt_mode_routes_to_prompter_instead_of_auto_allowing() {
// Regression: `Prompt` sorts above `DangerFullAccess` in the
// `PermissionMode` `Ord` derivation, so the `current_mode >= required_mode`
// ladder check used to auto-allow every tool in `Prompt` mode and never
// invoke the prompter — defeating the entire purpose of the mode.
let policy = PermissionPolicy::new(PermissionMode::Prompt)
.with_tool_requirement("read_file", PermissionMode::ReadOnly);
let mut prompter = RecordingPrompter {
seen: Vec::new(),
allow: true,
};
let outcome = policy.authorize("read_file", "{}", Some(&mut prompter));
assert_eq!(outcome, PermissionOutcome::Allow);
assert_eq!(prompter.seen.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(prompter.seen[0].tool_name, "read_file");
assert_eq!(prompter.seen[0].current_mode, PermissionMode::Prompt);
}
#[test]
fn prompt_mode_denies_when_no_prompter_is_available() {
let policy = PermissionPolicy::new(PermissionMode::Prompt)
.with_tool_requirement("read_file", PermissionMode::ReadOnly);
assert!(matches!(
policy.authorize("read_file", "{}", None),
PermissionOutcome::Deny { .. }
));
}
#[test]
fn prompt_mode_prompts_for_every_privilege_tier() {
// The ladder used to exist twice — once on the plain path and once inside
// the `Some(PermissionOverride::Allow)` arm — so a hook emitting
// `permissionDecision: "allow"` (see `hooks.rs`) had its own route to the
// auto-allow. Sweeping the tiers against both routes keeps them honest now
// that they are one predicate.
for required in [
PermissionMode::ReadOnly,
PermissionMode::WorkspaceWrite,
PermissionMode::DangerFullAccess,
] {
for override_decision in [None, Some(PermissionOverride::Allow)] {
let policy = PermissionPolicy::new(PermissionMode::Prompt)
.with_tool_requirement("read_file", required);
let context = PermissionContext::new(
override_decision,
override_decision.map(|_| "hook approved".to_string()),
);
let mut prompter = RecordingPrompter {
seen: Vec::new(),
allow: true,
};
let outcome =
policy.authorize_with_context("read_file", "{}", &context, Some(&mut prompter));
assert_eq!(
outcome,
PermissionOutcome::Allow,
"an approving prompter must still pass a {required:?} tool"
);
assert_eq!(
prompter.seen.len(),
1,
"prompt mode skipped the prompter for a {required:?} tool \
(override = {override_decision:?})"
);
assert_eq!(prompter.seen[0].tool_name, "read_file");
assert_eq!(prompter.seen[0].current_mode, PermissionMode::Prompt);
assert_eq!(prompter.seen[0].required_mode, required);
}
}
}
#[test]
fn privilege_rank_orders_the_privilege_tiers() {
assert!(
PermissionMode::ReadOnly.privilege_rank()
< PermissionMode::WorkspaceWrite.privilege_rank()
);
assert!(
PermissionMode::WorkspaceWrite.privilege_rank()
< PermissionMode::DangerFullAccess.privilege_rank()
);
}
#[test]
fn privilege_rank_places_the_operating_modes_above_every_tier() {
// `Prompt` and `Allow` are modes of operation rather than tiers, so
// `covers` answers for them by name and never consults this number. They
// still have to rank above every tier, because two callers outside this
// module — the `PermissionEnforcer`'s `check_with_required_mode` and the
// `claw doctor` permission check — compare ranks, and a `Prompt`/`Allow`
// session must keep the result it had under the old derived `Ord`.
for mode in [PermissionMode::Prompt, PermissionMode::Allow] {
assert!(
mode.privilege_rank() > PermissionMode::DangerFullAccess.privilege_rank(),
"{mode:?} must outrank danger-full-access"
);
assert!(
mode.privilege_rank() > PermissionMode::WorkspaceWrite.privilege_rank(),
"{mode:?} must outrank workspace-write"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn covers_never_compares_an_operating_mode_against_a_tier() {
for required in [
PermissionMode::ReadOnly,
PermissionMode::WorkspaceWrite,
PermissionMode::DangerFullAccess,
] {
assert!(
!PermissionMode::Prompt.covers(required),
"prompt mode must ask before running a {required:?} tool"
);
}
assert!(PermissionMode::Allow.covers(PermissionMode::DangerFullAccess));
assert!(PermissionMode::DangerFullAccess.covers(PermissionMode::WorkspaceWrite));
assert!(!PermissionMode::WorkspaceWrite.covers(PermissionMode::DangerFullAccess));
}
#[test]
fn applies_rule_based_denials_and_allows() {
let rules = RuntimePermissionRuleConfig::new(
+6 -17
View File
@@ -4222,18 +4222,15 @@ fn check_permission_health(permission_mode: PermissionModeProvenance) -> Diagnos
|| source.to_string(),
|env_var| format!("{source}:{env_var}"),
);
// Ranks, not declaration order: `PermissionMode` deliberately does not
// derive `Ord`, so the ladder is named at every comparison site.
let specs = mvp_tool_specs();
let active_rank = permission_mode.mode.privilege_rank();
let tools_satisfied = specs
.iter()
.filter(|spec| active_rank >= spec.required_permission.privilege_rank())
.filter(|spec| permission_mode.mode >= spec.required_permission)
.map(|spec| spec.name)
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
let tools_gated = specs
.iter()
.filter(|spec| active_rank < spec.required_permission.privilege_rank())
.filter(|spec| permission_mode.mode < spec.required_permission)
.map(|spec| spec.name)
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
@@ -7766,20 +7763,15 @@ impl LiveCli {
match result {
Ok(summary) => {
self.replace_runtime(runtime)?;
// The assistant response was already streamed to the terminal live
// during the turn (emit_output = true), so reprinting the full text
// here would duplicate the entire message. When text was streamed,
// emit a newline first so `spinner.finish`'s line-clear lands on a
// fresh line instead of erasing the last streamed line.
let final_text = final_assistant_text(&summary);
if !final_text.is_empty() {
println!();
}
spinner.finish(
"✨ Done",
TerminalRenderer::new().color_theme(),
&mut stdout,
)?;
let final_text = final_assistant_text(&summary);
if !final_text.is_empty() {
println!("{final_text}");
}
println!();
if let Some(event) = summary.auto_compaction {
println!(
@@ -7911,9 +7903,6 @@ impl LiveCli {
match new_runtime.run_turn(input, Some(&mut rp)) {
Ok(summary) => {
self.replace_runtime(new_runtime)?;
if !final_assistant_text(&summary).is_empty() {
println!();
}
spinner.finish(
if round == 0 {
"✨ Done (after auto-compact)"
+2 -52
View File
@@ -249,16 +249,6 @@ impl TerminalRenderer {
#[must_use]
pub fn render_markdown(&self, markdown: &str) -> String {
self.render_markdown_raw(markdown).trim_end().to_string()
}
/// Render markdown to ANSI without trimming trailing whitespace.
///
/// Block-level events (paragraphs, headings, lists, code blocks) emit their
/// trailing newline separators here. `render_markdown` trims them for
/// one-shot output, while streaming keeps them so that successive chunks
/// stay on their own lines instead of running together.
fn render_markdown_raw(&self, markdown: &str) -> String {
let normalized = normalize_nested_fences(markdown);
let mut output = String::new();
let mut state = RenderState::default();
@@ -277,7 +267,7 @@ impl TerminalRenderer {
);
}
output
output.trim_end().to_string()
}
#[must_use]
@@ -285,18 +275,6 @@ impl TerminalRenderer {
self.render_markdown(markdown)
}
/// Stream-friendly variant of `markdown_to_ansi` that preserves trailing
/// block separators (such as a paragraph's closing newlines).
///
/// `MarkdownStreamState::push` writes each rendered chunk directly to the
/// terminal with no separator of its own, so the trailing newlines must
/// survive here to keep a paragraph from sticking to the block that follows
/// it. The final `flush` still uses `markdown_to_ansi` to trim the tail.
#[must_use]
pub fn markdown_to_ansi_stream(&self, markdown: &str) -> String {
self.render_markdown_raw(markdown)
}
#[allow(clippy::too_many_lines)]
fn render_event(
&self,
@@ -631,7 +609,7 @@ impl MarkdownStreamState {
let split = find_stream_safe_boundary(&self.pending)?;
let ready = self.pending[..split].to_string();
self.pending.drain(..split);
Some(renderer.markdown_to_ansi_stream(&ready))
Some(renderer.markdown_to_ansi(&ready))
}
#[must_use]
@@ -1074,34 +1052,6 @@ mod tests {
assert!(plain_text.contains("fn nested()"));
}
#[test]
fn stream_rendering_preserves_block_separators() {
let renderer = TerminalRenderer::new();
// The stream variant keeps the paragraph-ending newlines that the
// one-shot variant trims, so consecutive streamed chunks do not run
// into each other when written back-to-back to the terminal.
let streamed = renderer.markdown_to_ansi_stream("Intro paragraph.\n\n");
assert!(streamed.ends_with('\n'));
assert!(!renderer
.markdown_to_ansi("Intro paragraph.\n\n")
.ends_with('\n'));
let mut state = MarkdownStreamState::default();
let first = state
.push(&renderer, "Intro paragraph.\n\n")
.expect("blank line closes the paragraph block");
let second = state
.push(&renderer, "1. first item\n\n")
.expect("blank line closes the list block");
let combined = strip_ansi(&format!("{first}{second}"));
assert!(combined.contains("Intro paragraph."));
assert!(combined.contains("1. first item"));
// The two blocks stay on separate lines instead of sticking together.
assert!(!combined.contains("Intro paragraph.1."));
}
#[test]
fn spinner_advances_frames() {
let terminal_renderer = TerminalRenderer::new();
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ fn compact_flag_streaming_text_only_emits_final_message_text() {
}
#[test]
fn text_prompt_mode_streams_assistant_text_once_before_spinner_completion() {
fn text_prompt_mode_prints_final_assistant_text_after_spinner() {
// given a workspace pointed at the mock Anthropic service running the
// streaming_text scenario which only emits a single assistant text block
let runtime = tokio::runtime::Runtime::new().expect("tokio runtime should build");
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ fn text_prompt_mode_streams_assistant_text_once_before_spinner_completion() {
],
);
// then the streamed answer should appear once before the spinner completion
// then stdout should contain the final assistant text, not just spinner output
assert!(
output.status.success(),
"text prompt run should succeed\nstdout:\n{}\n\nstderr:\n{}",
@@ -171,19 +171,19 @@ fn text_prompt_mode_streams_assistant_text_once_before_spinner_completion() {
);
let stdout = String::from_utf8(output.stdout).expect("stdout should be utf8");
let plain_stdout = strip_ansi_codes(&stdout);
let assistant_text = "Mock streaming says hello from the parity harness.";
assert_eq!(
plain_stdout.matches(assistant_text).count(),
1,
"text prompt stdout should contain the streamed assistant text exactly once ({stdout:?})"
assert!(
plain_stdout.contains("Mock streaming says hello from the parity harness."),
"text prompt stdout should include the assistant text ({stdout:?})"
);
assert!(
plain_stdout.contains("✔ ✨ Done"),
"text prompt stdout should still include spinner completion ({stdout:?})"
);
assert!(
plain_stdout.find(assistant_text) < plain_stdout.find("✔ ✨ Done"),
"text prompt stdout should stream the assistant text before spinner completion ({stdout:?})"
plain_stdout
.lines()
.any(|line| line == "Mock streaming says hello from the parity harness."),
"text prompt stdout should print the assistant text as its own line ({stdout:?})"
);
fs::remove_dir_all(&workspace).expect("workspace cleanup should succeed");
+1 -17
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import re
from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
from pathlib import Path
@@ -16,31 +15,16 @@ class StoredSession:
DEFAULT_SESSION_DIR = Path('.port_sessions')
# Session ids become filenames inside the session directory, so they must not be
# able to escape it via path separators or traversal. Restrict to the charset
# produced by legitimate ids (uuid4 hex, `session-<digits>-<n>`).
_SESSION_ID_PATTERN = re.compile(r'\A[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\Z')
def _validate_session_id(session_id: str) -> str:
if not _SESSION_ID_PATTERN.match(session_id):
raise ValueError(
f'invalid session_id {session_id!r}: only [A-Za-z0-9_-] characters are allowed'
)
return session_id
def save_session(session: StoredSession, directory: Path | None = None) -> Path:
session_id = _validate_session_id(session.session_id)
target_dir = directory or DEFAULT_SESSION_DIR
target_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
path = target_dir / f'{session_id}.json'
path = target_dir / f'{session.session_id}.json'
path.write_text(json.dumps(asdict(session), indent=2))
return path
def load_session(session_id: str, directory: Path | None = None) -> StoredSession:
session_id = _validate_session_id(session_id)
target_dir = directory or DEFAULT_SESSION_DIR
data = json.loads((target_dir / f'{session_id}.json').read_text())
return StoredSession(
-57
View File
@@ -9,66 +9,9 @@ from src.models import PermissionDenial
from src.path_scope import WorkspacePathScope, extract_path_candidates
from src.permissions import ToolPermissionContext
from src.query_engine import QueryEnginePort
from src.session_store import StoredSession, load_session, save_session
from src.tools import execute_tool
class SessionStorePathTraversalTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_traversal_session_id_is_rejected_on_load(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
store = Path(tmp) / 'store'
store.mkdir()
# A secret living outside the session store that traversal would reach.
(Path(tmp) / 'secret.json').write_text('{}')
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
load_session('../secret', directory=store)
def test_absolute_and_separator_session_ids_are_rejected(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
store = Path(tmp) / 'store'
store.mkdir()
for bad_id in (
'/etc/passwd',
'nested/child',
r'nested\child',
r'C:\Windows\win.ini',
'..',
'a/../../b',
):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
load_session(bad_id, directory=store)
def test_traversal_session_id_is_rejected_on_save(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
store = Path(tmp) / 'store'
store.mkdir()
session = StoredSession(
session_id='../escape',
messages=('hello',),
input_tokens=1,
output_tokens=2,
)
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
save_session(session, directory=store)
self.assertFalse((Path(tmp) / 'escape.json').exists())
def test_legitimate_session_id_round_trips(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
store = Path(tmp) / 'store'
session = StoredSession(
session_id='session-1775386832313-0',
messages=('hi', 'there'),
input_tokens=3,
output_tokens=4,
)
path = save_session(session, directory=store)
self.assertEqual(store, path.parent)
loaded = load_session('session-1775386832313-0', directory=store)
self.assertEqual(session, loaded)
class WorkspacePathScopeTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_direct_parent_escape_is_denied(self) -> None:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp: