Jordan Harband 882ed79ece [Docs] threat model: document the mirror payload/metadata trust boundary ...

Payloads
(binaries, plus source tarballs that nvm compiles and runs at install time) are trusted by construction,
since nvm exists to build and run them;
parsed metadata (index.tab, SHASUMS, LTS codenames) is not,
and must never reach a command evaluator,
an awk/sed program body,
or an unvalidated filesystem path.
This records why the existing version-string and checksum hardening exists,
and scopes a malicious payload from a configured mirror as out of scope:
no privilege boundary is crossed.

2026-07-15 13:44:04 -07:00

..

ISSUE_TEMPLATE

[meta] disable blank issues

2024-11-04 15:07:16 +00:00

workflows

[actions] add tests-alpine: a green fast suite and a musl-binary regression matrix

2026-07-14 23:18:07 -07:00

external-threat-actor.png

[security] add threat model

2023-11-15 10:10:29 -08:00

FUNDING.yml

[meta] create FUNDING.yml

2019-11-05 12:05:09 -08:00

INCIDENT_RESPONSE_PLAN.md

[meta] update security policy; add IRP

2025-06-23 16:11:48 -07:00

insider-threat-actor-and-libs.png

[security] add threat model

2023-11-15 10:10:29 -08:00

SECURITY.md

[security] add security escalation policy

2025-09-15 14:33:37 +02:00

THREAT_MODEL.md

[Docs] threat model: document the mirror payload/metadata trust boundary

2026-07-15 13:44:04 -07:00