[Fix] nvm_get_checksum: pass the tarball name to awk as data, not program text

The awk program string-interpolated the slug
(which embeds the untrusted, mirror-supplied version)
into its source, so a crafted version such as
`v1"==$2){system("touch${IFS}/tmp/x")}#`
was executed by awk's `system()`.
Pass the value via `-v tarball=...` so awk treats it as data and never as code.

See GHSA-3c52-35h2-gfmm
(a second injection sink fed by the same untrusted version field that `nvm_download`'s eval was; the source-install path reaches this during a normal `nvm install <version>`).
This commit is contained in:
Jordan Harband
2026-06-03 13:11:26 -07:00
parent 6d870d182c
commit 90bb88748b
2 changed files with 29 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
#!/bin/sh
WORK="${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/nvm_get_checksum_awk.$$"
PROOF="${WORK}/PWNED"
cleanup () {
unset -f die cleanup nvm_download
rm -rf "${WORK}"
}
die () { echo "$@" ; cleanup ; exit 1; }
\. ../../../nvm.sh
mkdir -p "${WORK}"
# GHSA-3c52-35h2-gfmm: nvm_get_checksum must treat the (untrusted, version-derived)
# slug as awk data, never as awk program text.
# given a crafted slug carrying an unconditional awk system() action
# and a mock that supplies one SHASUMS record (so such an action would fire)
nvm_download () { printf 'deadbeef sometarball\n'; }
# when nvm_get_checksum runs with that slug as its 4th argument
rm -f "${PROOF}"
nvm_get_checksum node std v1 'x" == $2) print $1} {system("touch${IFS}'"$PROOF"'")} #' tar.gz >/dev/null 2>&1
# then the injected awk code must not execute
[ ! -e "${PROOF}" ] || die 'awk injection fires in nvm_get_checksum (slug interpolated into awk program text)'
cleanup
echo 'nvm_get_checksum awk injection: passed'